

KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY
GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIVE DIRECTORATE
 No. G-3/33-19 on 28.12.1998

military secret
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Report on the statements of the
 Commanders of the KLA OZ /Operative Zones/
 -addressed to - Dep. Com. of the KLA GS /General Staff/

On the basis of the order requiring statements No. 82-1/111 of 11.12.1998, addressed to the Operative Zone commanders, the reporting in question was carried out on 20.12.1998. Having analysed the written statements of the OZ Commanders of Dukagjin, Pashtrik, Neredime, Shala and Llap

I submit the following report regarding matters dealt in the statements:

- a) Leading and commanding;-** it can be stated that they are at an appropriate level in all OZ-s. There is considerable lack of professional staff especially in the Dukagjin and Neredime OZ-s.

In the Dukagjin OZ, the Headquarters Chief of Staff is to be named, then the Dep. Com. /Deputy Commander/ for the intelligence service, the Dep. Com. for information, the Commander of Brigade 133; the Commander of Brigade 134 has been wounded, whereas the operational departments of brigades 131,132,133 and 134 are vacant.

In the Neredime OZ, still vacant are: operational department, radio communications department, department of civil defence and the personnel department. Also vacant are the operational departments of brigades 161 and 162.

Most of the brigade commands in the OZ of Pashtrik consist of active army officers.

One officer is required in the Llap OZ in the zone Command operational department as well as in the operational department of brigades 151 and 152.

In most of the command positions of all the zones mentioned, at all command levels from the squad to the OZ level, people who have proved themselves in combat up to now, both in terms of bravery and organisational and command skills, have been appointed.

- b) Combat morale;-** with the reorganisation and the filling of vacancies with staff, with re-appointments that have been carried out in all OZ-s, combat morale of the soldiers and the population, that is joining the KLA more and more by the day, has risen considerably. In all the zones great interest is felt, especially by the young, to join KLA. High combat morale has been shown in clashes that KLA units had with enemy police – paramilitary and military forces in different parts of Kosovo, especially in the Dukagjin, Pashtrik and Llap OZ-s. The enemy suffered considerable losses in dead and equipment with minimal consequences for our KLA units.

c) Training;- more work should be done with new soldiers that joined the KLA in all OZ-s in the following segments:

- knowledge of the collective armament,
- knowledge of the tactical actions,
- military rules in general.

Soldiers that have been in the KLA earlier and have participated up till now in clashes with the enemy, possess appropriate knowledge regarding the handling of the personal and collective arms, as well as tactical actions and military rules in general.

It remains a primary duty of all the OZ-s commands to train the new soldiers engaged in the KLA units.

OZ Commanders should do more in training officers commanding with the basic tactical units and higher levels, taking into consideration the above mentioned commands' training for leading tactical activities in combat in different situations; manoeuvring, firing, in organising firing against armoured vehicles, as well as other actions.

d) Mobilisation and matters of personnel;- mobilisation in all OZ-s has been carried out on voluntary bases, which will continue also in the future. Up till now there the level of mobilisation has been high. The demands of the young to mobilise in the KLA could not be met for objective reasons, such as, for example, lack of armament, clothing and shelter.

Sheltering difficulties of KLA units are considerable especially in the Dukagjin OZ due to the destruction that suffered that area during the enemy offensives. Special importance was given to the recruitment of the young by the Dukagjin OZ, which has four recruitment centres, where all the criteria determined by the KLA provisional rules are observed, in order to avoid negative consequences of euphoric mobilisation that took place in this zone up to the enemy offensive that resulted with the desertion of a good number of people under arms, and in many cases in a total dismemberment of some units. The Llap OZ is distinguished from other OZ-s for organising both territorial and civil defence. Other zones are working in the organisation of TD /Territorial Defence/and the formation of Civil Headquarters.

e) Logistics- the supply with military technology is carried out at OZ level and sometimes at brigade level. Also the supply with goods has mainly been done at OZ level, at brigade and lower levels of command respectively. The supply with military means and goods for appropriate units depends on the skill of certain levels of command and the financial situation of the population. From written reports of OZ Commanders the following general conclusion can be reached:

- lack of sophisticated arms is felt in all OZ-s, especially of those used against armoured vehicles.
- There is lack of ammunition (OZ-s of Pashtrik, Neredime and Shala, less than one k/l /extension unknown/) for all collective and personal arms of the KLA units,
- More difficulties in supplies with goods occur in the Dukagjin OZ (shelter especially) and partly in Pashtrik and Shala OZ-s.
- There is considerable lack of clothing and personal armaments for new conscripts who have enlisted voluntarily in all OZ-s.

- The level in the sphere of health is appropriate except that lack of adequate facilities is felt in the Dukagjin OZ.

f) Defence and safety;- can be said to be at an appropriate level except in the Neredime OZ, where there is no organisation of defence and safety in Brigade 162, which still has not been positioned in the defending line. Guard posts have been determined at all key points where the KLA units are active, scout units are engaged in reconnaissance for greater safety. Special units and military police provide special help by successfully facing the enemy's special war and its collaborators.

There is great lack of communication lines that would make possible more efficient communication between all KLA units in all OZ-s thus increasing the efficiency for the defence and safety.

g) Combat situation;-

- **enemy forces** – increased concentration of enemy forces is noticed in the border area, both in border watchtowers and in the villages of the border zone up to five kilometres in depth in an air line distance from the border. There is increased concentration in all military barracks in towns. Primary roads in the whole of the Kosovo territory are controlled by military police-paramilitary forces and there are patrols and escorts of international observers in secondary roads as well. Following UN Security Council Resolution 1199, enemy forces have withdrawn from some dominant points (for example Sukat in the Dukagjin OZ), and some of them have not been placed under the control of our forces. In clashes that our units had with enemy forces, low combat morale and readiness was noticed among the enemy forces.
- **our forces-** the number of soldiers and the armament are not constant, they vary depending on the arrival of military means. The increase of the number of soldiers is noticeable especially in the Dukagjin OZ. Following the enemy offensive, the repositioning of forces has been carried out in all OZ-s and we can freely say that the territory controlled by our units is now of a greater percentage than prior to the enemy offensive. Special approach was carried out in organising the KLA units in towns and those parts that are not under the control of KLA regular units. The subordination line from the highest level of command, GS, and down to the squad is at an appropriate level.
- **Co-operation and co-ordination between zones, especially neighbouring zones with civilian structures** – an increasing cooperation is noticed especially between neighbouring zones. We distinguish the cooperation between Llap and Shala OZ-s, then Pashtrik and Dukagjin OZ-s at a time when the Dukagjin OZ was at an unenviable position. It is worth pointing out the contribution that “Toni” and “Mici” gave in the organisation and the sending of people and means to the Dukagjin OZ. An example of cooperation between the Dukagjin and Drenica OZ-s is the dispatch of two companies from the Drenica OZ to the Dukagjin OZ that served with honour and helped in overcoming the situation following the offensive.
- Cooperation with civilian structures is good and increasing all the time.

- In OZ-s written reports the lack of the military means repairs departments is pointed out.

gj) Proposals for the use of tactical and operational units for combat activities in the future;- the following proposals taken from the commanders' written reports have been singled out:

- acting in commando groups in towns and inside the zones where the enemy is active,
- cutting out enemy supply lines through diversion actions,
- hitting everywhere the living enemy forces in order to inflict insecurity at all times and everywhere.
- The compilation of operational plans for the use of the units in the future is requested from the KLA GS.

h) Requests from the KLA GS;- the following requests from the KLA GS have been singled out:

- sophisticated combat-technology means for use in towns and their equal distribution to the zones are requested from the logistics department,
- there are requests for filling the positions pointed out under a) with professional staff,
- the request for communication means (signal-corps),
- more work to be done with OZ commanders,
- financial means according to the GS plan to fulfil the needs of OZ-s.

S. V/SH.A /expansion unknown/ [seal]
- the archive
- dep. Com. of GH

Chief of Staff of KLA GH
Colonel
Bislim Zyrap
/signature/